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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 This paper proposes a simple framework for understanding endogenous 
transaction costs - their composition, size and implications. In a model of 
diversification against risk, we distinguish between investments in institutions 
that facilitate exchange and the costs of conducting exchange itself. Institutional 
quality and market size are determined by the decisions of risk averse agents 
and conditions are discussed under which the efficient allocation may be 
decentralized. We highlight a number of differences with models where 
transaction costs are exogenous, including the implications for taxation and 
measurement issues. 
JEL Classiffication: D02; D51; L14. 
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1 Introduction
Transaction costs are the costs of collecting information, bargaining, commu-
nicating, decision making, and enforcing contracts between individuals, rms
and the state (Coase, 1960). The perception of such costs as exogenously im-
peding trade or inhibiting the formation of complete contracts suggests that
reducing, eliminating or avoiding those exogenous costs is generally welfare
enhancing.1 As the quality of contracting institutions (institutions, for short)
is thought to be a part of what explains those transaction costs,2 the impli-
cation is that better institutions improve economic outcomes.
This paper introduces a simple framework in which the costs of exchange
are determined by optimal investment in the quality of institutions. Total
transaction costs are the sum of two components: There is a cost to form-
ing the public and private institutions that govern, ex ante, the terms of
exchange, and there are costs to conducting exchange once the state of na-
ture is resolved.3 Agents choose the resources allocated to reducing exchange
costs and how extensively they will trade with others.
By viewing transaction costs as an endogenous component of a general
equilibrium set-up, we are able to draw a number of important distinctions
with models where transaction costs are left as exogenous. First, while the
costs of exchange can be can be too high, they can also be too low. A high
1See, for example, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) and Townsend and Ueda (2006) in
relation to nance, growth and inequality; Levchenko (2007) on international trade; and
Dixit (1996) on political economy.
2See Levchenko (2007) and Acemoglu, Antràs and Helpman (2007) for a similar per-
spective.
3Throughout, an exchange cost is the cost of conducting a particular exchange and
what we refer to as the transaction costis the sum of investments in institutions and the
subsequent costs of exchanges that occur.
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exchange cost reects fewer resources directed towards facilitating transac-
tions but may be associated with greater expected utility if those resources
increase consumption and agents choose to make fewer costly exchanges.
Although this is a natural consequence of a set-up where we make transac-
tion costs endogenous, we show that this has important implications for tax
policy. Institutions might be designed to maximize the size of markets, for
example, but when the costs of the institutions themselves are considered, we
show that the simple market-size maximizing institution generally implies a
higher than optimal tax rate. Moreover, an institution that minimizes trans-
action costs, such as suggested by the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE)
literature,4 is also seen to be generally sub-optimal.
Second, making transaction costs endogenous permits us to understand
the existence and extent of whatWallis and North (1986) refer to as the trans-
action sector. Coase (1992, p.716) argues that a large part of economic
activity is directed at alleviating transaction costs, whilst Wallis and North
(1986) estimate that the transaction sector comprised half of US GNP in
1970, a proportion which had grown signicantly over the preceding century.
We nd that a more wealthy economy is characterized by a smaller trans-
action sector, but one based on greater investments in institutions, larger
markets and lower exchange costs.
Third, part of the contracting institution is naturally modelled as a pure
public good and so for the competitive equilibrium to be e¢ cient all political
rents need to be competed away. Endogenous transaction costs thus suggest
4Equilibrium in the TCE framework is where transactions. . . are aligned with gov-
ernance structures. . . so as to e¤ect a (mainly) transaction cost economizing outcome"
(Williamson, 2010: p.681).
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a rationale for the arguments of Schumpeter (1942) and Wittman (1989),
that democratic political systems can deliver e¢ cient economic outcomes.
Fourth, we consider the e¤ect of a transactions tax. Where transaction
costs are exogenous, agents respond by reducing market size for su¢ cient in-
creases in tax. When they are endogenous, however, agents invest more in in-
stitutions to ameliorate the e¤ect of the tax on the costs of exchange, thereby
making diversication decisions less sensitive to increases in the transactions
tax. However, while apparently more robust to the imposition of a trans-
action tax, agents opt for autarky at a lower transaction tax than might be
anticipated.
Our framework relates to a number of other papers. The idea that in-
vestments in better transaction technologies can be part of an e¢ cient eco-
nomic system has been put forward by De Alessi (1983), Barzel (1985) and
Williamson (1998). In making transaction costs endogenous, we are also
blurring the distinction between institutional and technological e¢ ciency, as
Antràs and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) have noted in relation to organizations
and trade. The gains from allocating resources to institutions relates to the
idea of a state capacityin Besley and Persson (Forthcoming); our approach
also considers the possibility of a private capacitythat might substitute for
or complement investments in public institutions. While this paper focuses
on the costs incurred in risk sharing, Martins-da-Rocha and Vailakis (2010)
considers how transaction costs in nancial markets can be made endogenous
to the labor costs incurred in nancial intermediation.
The model is set out in Section 2. Section 3 characterizes e¢ cient equi-
libria, that is the optimal investment in institutional capital, the optimal
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extent of transaction costs and the optimal market size. The conditions are
discussed in Section 4 under which the e¢ cient equilibrium may be decen-
tralized. Section 5 reports the implications of our model in the light of extant
empirical evidence. Section 6 examines the impact of (simple) non-optimal
institutions while Section 7 looks at the impact of an exogenous transaction
tax. Section 8 summarizes and concludes. Appendices contain some proofs,
further numerical analysis of the model and a detailed description of the
decentralized equilibrium.
2 The model: overview
We briey outline the model (which is motivated by Townsend, 1978) before
presenting it in detail. A large number of risk averse agents are each en-
dowed with the same amount of capital. Agents can di¤er in the technology
with which they can produce the consumption good but, initially, know only
the distribution of possible technologies. Consumption risk can be reduced
by forming markets with other agents but due to exchange costs it is not
feasible to replicate a complete Arrow-Debreu allocation. The cost of each
bilateral exchange is determined in a simple way by the quality of contracting
institutions in the economy.5 As such, before they realise their productivity,
agents decide whether or not to form a market with other agents and, if they
do, how large that market should be and how much to invest in private (i.e.,
excludable) and public institutional quality.
5Intuitively, consider the adoption, ex ante, of standard accounting practices by a set
of rms. It is doubtless costly to establish such a framework. However, ex post, there are
still costs to running the system such as inputting data or prudential auditing.
5
One agent per market becomes an intermediary, buying outputs and sell-
ing consumption bundles. Intermediaries are here the productive unit of the
transaction sector, using the institutional capital as input to a common ex-
change cost technology (ECT), the output of which is the exchange cost
incurred by agents in its market. Ex post, agents honor their obligations
even if it would be preferable to renege. If agents do not join a market then
no institutional investment takes place. The primary aim of Sections 3-4 is
to characterize the e¢ cient level of institutional capital, exchange costs and
market size (consumption risk-sharing) for such a model economy.
2.1 Preferences and production technology
The economy is populated by a countable innity of agents, i 2 I. All agents
have the same utility function, u (c), with a constant degree of relative risk
aversion. Each is endowed with the same amount of capital, 0 < k < 1.
Agent i produces amount iyi of the non-storable consumption good, where
yi  k is the amount of capital used in production. The set of possible
technologies, , is nite and bounded away from innity. i is distributed
i.i.d. across agents with p
 
i

denoting the probability of any agent drawing
i; and
P
2 p () = 1.
Let ! represent the state of nature, i.e., a list of i for all i 2 I. Let 

be the set of all possible states of nature, and p (!) the probability of some
! occurring and
R
!2
 p(!) = 1.
6
6Precisely, p(!) is the probability of the state of nature in a small interval d! occurring.
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2.2 Diversication and intermediation
To diversify against risk, agents can form markets in a star network around
a single intermediary, as in Townsend (1978). A market is a set of agents
M  I with cardinality #M < @0; so a market is nite-sized. The set of
agents with whom agent i exchanges directly is denoted N i. Agent h 2 M
is an intermediary if N i = h for i 2 Mnh and Nh = Mnh. So markets
are disjoint and agents only exchange with one intermediary. Mh denotes
the market intermediated by agent h 2 H where H  I is the set of all
intermediaries in the economy.
Agents can exchange some of their endowment of capital on a one-for-one
basis for shares in the consumption portfolio compiled by the intermediary,
less their contributions to the total costs of transactions. Each agent in a
market exchanges twice with the intermediary, so for a given exchange cost,
, the per-agent cost of exchange in a market of size #M is 2

#M 1
#M

.
2.3 Institutional capital and exchange costs
Intermediaries form markets using institutional capital as an input to an
exchange cost technology (ECT) which determines the cost of exchange in
that market. There is free-entry to intermediation (i.e., the ECT is ac-
cessible to all agents). Institutional capital takes two forms: There is a
market-specic institutional capital (S-capital) and a general economy-wide
institutional capital (G-capital). Agent i allocates the portion  is and 
i
g of
the endowment to each respective type of capital, where 0   is +  ig  1. In
a market intermediated by agent h, the exchange cost, h, is determined as
7
follows:
h =

1  F  Sh; G k: (1)
where F () is the ECT, which is concave, continuous and increasing in each
of its arguments and satises some Inada-type conditions.7 The range of F
is the unit interval, so 0  h  k. Since the exchange cost is proportional
to k it is akin to an iceberg cost. We assume that S-capital is the average
contribution of agents in a market and G-capital is the average across the
whole economy.8 Given that all agents are identical ex ante, all will make
the same allocations and so we generally omit superscripts. Clearly, then,
S   sk and G   gk. The ex ante allocations, ( s +  g) k, combined with
the ex post costs, 2

#M 1
#M

, make up total transaction costs.
The distinction between S-capital and G-capital is natural. S-capital re-
ects activities specic to the transaction being madeorganizational choices,
private infrastructure or learning about property rightsand is local and ex-
cludable. On the other hand, G-capital reects the general legal enforcement
of contracts, duciary duties, public infrastructures or competition policy
but is, by contrast, an economy-wide public good. Each type of institutional
capital clearly impacts upon the other, and we assume that S and G are
complements, so FSG = FGS > 0. Without a public institution, S-capital
would be less e¤ective; without S-capital, there may be little point in an
7Namely: F (0; 0) = 0 and F (S;G) ! 1 as fS;Gg ! f1;1g. Next, FS(S;G) ! 1
as S ! 0, and FS(S;G) ! 0 as S ! 1; analogous conditions obtain with respect to
G. So dened, F ensures that the nullarrangement of zero investment in S-capital and
G-capital is always equivalent to there being no gains from trade.
8In other words, there is no institutional scale e¤ect: The introduction of an agent
into a market requires an equal additional contribution to keep the exchange cost for that
market constant.
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economy-wide institution.
3 E¢ cient equilibria
The purpose of this Section is to characterize e¢ cient allocations in a cooper-
ative setting; i.e., in an economy where intermediaries arise exogenously and
where there is no di¢ culty providing the public good, G. We subsequently
show that the e¢ cient cooperative allocations coincide with those that are
in the core (Proposition 5), and then that competitive equilibria are Pareto
optimal under some conditions on the provision of G (Section 4).
An intermediary h makes an allocation for a market which is an n-tuple
f#M; f s;  gg; ; y; ci(!)g. The intermediary allocation is that which max-
imises his own expected utility,
max
#M;s;g ;
Z
!2

p (!)u

ch(!)

(2)
subject to,
X
i2M
ci(!) 
X
i2M
i(!)y (3)
2(#M   1)  #M [(1   s    g)k   y] ; (4)
G   gk; (5)
S   sk; (6)
 s +  g  1;  s  0;  g  0; (7)
 = [1  F (S;G)] k; (8)
E

u
 
ci
 jh  E u  cijh0 8i;8h0; for h0 feasible. (9)
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Equation (3) limits consumption to be less than or equal to output in each
state of nature, on a market-wide basis. Equation (4) says that, in any mar-
ket, the sum of endowments net of production and institutional investment
must be su¢ cient to cover the total of market exchange costs. Equations (5)-
(6) describe institutional capital, (7) restricts the range of feasible f s;  gg,
and (8) describes the exchange cost. Finally, equation (9) is a participation
constraint requiring that the utility of all agents in market h be at least as
high as participating in another feasible market.9 Implicit in the maximisa-
tion of (2) is a participation constraint for the intermediary; if,
X
2
p ()u [k] >
Z
!2

p (!)u

ch(!)jh ; for all h feasible,
then no intermediated market with exchange is formed (i.e., #M = 1;  s =
 g = 0).
3.1 Optimality
All agents share an aliquot consumption payout in each market as determined
by the observed average technology for that market, (!; h) = (#M) 1
P
i2Mh 
i(!).
One more assumption is required before stating Proposition 1 which estab-
lishes that well-dened solutions to (2) exist. Recall that total per capita
costs are 2

#M 1
#M

. If for all k it is the case that (1   s    g) k  2;
then the optimal market size will be bounded since perfect diversication
would imply non-positive consumption. Hence, let an arbitrary maximum
value of k be k. Let K  [k; k] where k < k; be the set of potential endow-
9It will turn out that (7) is implied by (9).
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ments. When k = k, as shown below, investments in ECT will be at their
maximum level:  s;  g.10 A su¢ cient condition for nite-sized markets to be
part of the optimal plan is then,
2(1 maxF ())  (1   s    g): (10)
(10) ensures that there exists a M  #M(k), where M is a nite integer
which may serve as an upper bound on optimal market size. Let M 
1; :::; M

be the set of feasible market sizes. In short, (10) imposes that
exchange costs do not fall too quicklyas institutional capital rises.
Proposition 1 For each (k; !) ; (i) the maximum of (2) is attained and (ii)
the value function, V (k); is well-dened and continuous. (iii) The optimal
policy correspondence may not be unique.
Proof. The relevant measure space is given by the triple (
; !; p), where ! is
a -algebra, the collection of all the subsets of 
, and p is the measure dened
on !. An agents expected utility is, therefore, Eu(c)  R
!2
 p(!)u (c (!)),
where the utility function is strictly concave. Also, note that:
k 2 K  R++; (11)
f s;  gg 2 T  R2+; (12)
#M 2M  N: (13)
10S-capital and G-capital are essentially normal goods, purchasesof both rising in k.
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Decisions on  s;  g and #M are taken after k is known but before agents
productivities are revealed. Using (12) and (13), dene the feasible policy
choices as follows:   : K ! T M: That is, T M is the product space,


[0; 1]2; 1

;


[0; 1]2; 2

;


[0; 1]2; 3

; :::;


[0; 1]2; M
	
:
For each ! 2 
,   is clearly a non-empty, compact-valued, continuous corre-
spondence. A typical element of that mapping is denoted z 2  (k; !). The
optimization problem, therefore, involves a strictly concave criterion function
and a non-empty, compact constraint set, so that the maximum is attained.
Since the maximum is attained, the value function, V (k); is well-dened. It
follows from the Theorem of the Maximum that V (k) is continuous. As the
feasible policy set is not strictly convex, the optimal policy
G(k; !) = fz 2  (k; !) : Eu(c) = V (k)g
need not be unique. Finally, the equivalence between the cooperative case
and core allocations is established in Proposition 5.
Some properties of e¢ cient equilibria are immediate. Since the ECT is
freely accessible, rents from intermediation must be zero so (5)(6) hold with
equality. The optimal allocations to the ECT is the pair

 s; 

g
	
which
satises,
kFS = 1; (14)
kFG = 1; (15)
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where   2

#M 1
#M

; and FX (X  S;G) denotes a partial derivative of
F
 
Sh; G

. So, for any market size, the optimal institutional investments
equate the marginal cost with the marginal gain from reducing the exchange
cost. When there are no transactions, agents would not undertake such
investment and the optimal choice of market size satises
argmax

Eu((1  ) k): (16)
Clearly, the optimal market size is unity,  = 0. The choices  s = 0;  g = 0
and #M = 1 also dene the unique reservation utility for any agent to
be a member of any #M > 1 coalition, V =
P
2 p ()u [k], 8k: That
furthermore ensure that 0  ( s +  g) < 1:11 A direct implication of the
reservation value of utility is that any equilibrium of the model in which
 s > 0 and  g > 0 is one in which #M > 1, necessarily.
Remark 1 follows from analysis of (14) and (15):
Remark 1 For #M > 1 and endowment k, Equations (14) and (15) dene
a unique pair,

#Ms ; 
#M
g
	
such that #Ms > 0 and 
#M
g > 0. For #M =
1; equations (14) and (15) imply #Ms = 0 and 
#M
g = 0. For a given
endowment, optimal investments in the ECT rise and bilateral exchange costs
fall as the market size increases.
11That (16) generates a unique reservation value of utility is not quite so trivial as it
may at rst appear. In particular, it is di¤erent to Townsend (1978). In that paper, agents
take the per capita exchange cost as given. Even so, the optimal market size may well be
greater than one. In the present set-up, when agents take the exchange cost as given, the
optimal market size is necessarily one. This is due to our scaling the exchange cost by
capital.
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The choice of any market size greater than one is determined by the ECT
and agentsattitude to risk. (14) and (15) determine e¢ cient investment in
the ECT and hence total resources diverted from goods production. Agents
risk aversion provides an upper bound on how much they are willing to pay
for consumption insurance, given an alternative not to diversify; that bound
is independent of the ECT. Agents will optimally form markets with#M > 1
when e¢ cient investment in the ECT delivers transaction costs lower than
that bound.12
The rest of the analysis of equilibrium is contained in the following four
Propositions. One can show that in general there is a critical level of k below
which transaction costs dominate and agents do not diversify:
Proposition 2 There is a k > 0 small enough such that optimal market size
is one.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The key to understanding that Proposition is to recall that S =  sk. So,
a given  has a larger proportionate impact on  as k rises, even though 
itself is proportional to k. Hence, higher levels of k permit lower ex post
transaction costs and help sustain larger market sizes and the benets from
consumption risk sharing.
Proposition 2 also indicates the possibility of multiple optimal plans.
Proposition 3 now shows that no more than two such alternative plans can
exist.
12That explains why agents may move from autarky(#M = 1) to a market size #M >
2 for a small change in k. This is apparent in the numerical simulations diverisciation
at market sizes in between is too costly given the ECT and the degree of risk aversion.
Proposition 3 shows that subsequent increases in market size will be in steps of one.
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Proposition 3 The optimal policy correspondence contains at most two plans.
Proof. See Appendix A.
As a corollary, it follows that for any #M > 1 which is optimal, subse-
quent market size increases are single steps for (su¢ ciently large) increases
in k. The nal Proposition and following remarks establish that multiple
equilibria can arise although they are, in a sense, special cases.
Proposition 4 Let K denote the Borel sets of K  R++: There exists a
level of k 2 K; call it k, such that
Eu

[(1   1) k   11k] 
 
!;Mh1
	
= Eu

[(1   2) k   22k] 
 
!;Mh2
	
where  1 6=  2; 1 6= 2, Mh1 6= Mh2 and where maximized utility is identical
under both programs.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The set of values of k which result in multiple equilibria is of measure
zero. That is, such values of k correspond to pairs of 0s; these 0s are
a proper subset of the rationals and hence themselves drawn from a set of
measure zero.
To summarize: Low endowment economies may resort to autarky (Propo-
sition 2). However, for economies with larger endowments (k > k) it is opti-
mal to invest in the ECT and to form markets (Proposition 1 and Remark
1). Equilibrium plans need not be unique (Proposition 4) but those equilib-
ria are, in a sense, of limited interest (Proposition 3 and the brief discussion
following Proposition 4). Finally:
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Proposition 5 The allocations of the cooperative economy coincide with
core allocations.
Proof. See Appendix A.
4 Equilibrium with competitive intermedia-
tion
The question now is: Can the e¢ cient outcome be decentralized? First, note
that given the public good nature of the G-capital, there is a free-riding
problem associated with investment in G-capital:
Proposition 6 In the core, voluntary allocations to general capital are zero.
Proof. See Appendix B.
In arguments later echoed forcefully by Wittman (1989), Schumpeter
(1942, p. 269) asserted that political markets work in much the same way
as do competitive economic markets: (T)he democratic method is that in-
stitutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individu-
als acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the
peoples vote.13 We formalize this perspective and consider a democratic
political outcome to be the result of a political market with free-entry: Any
agent can costlessly propose a manifesto which species taxes for all agents
and the level of G-capital to be provided. The manifesto with the largest
13Wittman (1989, pp. 13956) argues ...that democratic political markets are organized
to promote wealth-maximizing outcomes, that these markets are highly competitive and
that political entrepreneurs are rewarded for e¢ cient behavior.
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share of votes is enforced ex post.14 Proposition 7 shows that such political
competition then yields an e¢ cient outcome; the competitive G provision
will be G =  gk.
Proposition 7 If any agent may propose an enforceable political manifesto
then all agents will be taxed according to (15). It follows that G = G.
Proof. See Appendix B.
There is no such problem in the provision of S-capital as free-entry to
intermediation (i.e., any agent may become an intermediary) ensures that
all rents are competed away. In Appendix C the decentralized economy is
studied. It is established that there exists a unique, Pareto-optimal allocation
in each market with a unique intermediary in each market.
Proposition 8 The provision of S-capital and G-capital is Pareto optimal
in the competitive equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix C.
5 The size of the transaction sector
Wallis and North (1986) were the rst to quantify the size of the US trans-
action sector. They found that in 1870 it accounted for 25% of GNP, rising
to 50% in 1970.15 That the size of the transaction sector appears positively
14So we invoke ex ante perfect competition and ex post monopoly in the political process.
Relaxation of either assumption might provide a focus for understanding the existence and
power of elites.
15The transaction sector appears to be important in other advanced economies. See
Wang (2003) and Klaes (2008) for surveys.
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related to wealth has been thought to sit uneasily with the view that low
transaction costs are one of the spurs of development.16
Our simple framework is not designed to connect directly with the em-
pirical estimates of the transaction sector and a number of problems exist
in an attempt to do so.17 Nevertheless, the model developed here may be
used to reinterpret the Wallis and North nding. We let  measure the size
of the transaction sector (the proportion of the endowment not allocated to
the production of the consumption good):
  (k   y)=k =  s +  g +  [1  F (S;G)] (17)
Some comparative static results are intuitive. Suppose that at some k, the
optimal market size is #M 0 > 1;  is necessarily higher at any #M 00 >
#M 0 since otherwise an equilibrium with lower transaction costs and better
risk-sharing properties is available. The higher is k, the lower is  for any
given market size since agents invest more to reduce the costs of exchange
(see Appendix D). As k increases, then, the cost of further diversication
approaches the additional consumption-smoothing gain and for a su¢ ciently
large increase in k optimal market size increases.18 Figure 1 summarizes
16Consider the conclusions in Klaes (2008): "...economies with less well-developed trans-
action sectors appear to exhibit lower levels of transaction costs if those costs are measured
in terms of sector size, whereas micro-structurally those economies in fact su¤er from higher
levels of transaction costs due to signicant barriers to smooth exchange and coordination
of economic activity."
17The model hinges on a distinction between ex ante and ex post costs which, empirically,
is not generally measured. Moreover, we assume agents are acting optimally.
18Proposition 3 shows that market size must increase by one from any #M > 1; and
the discussion preceding Proposition 2 explains how market size can jump by more than
one when moving from #M = 1.
18
results from a numerical version of the model (see Appendix E).19 One
nds that optimal transaction costs can be substantial; that large part of
market activity referred to by Coase (1992) is reected in our simple general
equilibrium framework.
Figure 1: Equilibrium over a range of the endowment
Proportionate investments in institutions can increase in k, as Figure 1
demonstrates;20 while the number of exchanges increases and institutional
19We adopt an ECT with constant elasticity of substitution of 2 whilst agents have
a coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion of 3. For Figure 1 we allow the e¤ectiveness of S-
capital and G-capital to di¤er slightly, although none of our results are sensitive to this
assumption. See Appendix Table 2 for details.
20Appendix D identies a su¢ cient condition on the ECT for that to be the case.
19
investment grows, total transaction costs ultimately fall (although the rela-
tion is non-monotonic). In other words, a wealthier economy has a larger
and more sophisticated transaction sector, one based on greater investments
in contracting institutions, larger markets and lower exchange costs. Em-
pirically, the payo¤ from the greater investments lower costs of individual
exchanges are di¢ cult to identify in sectoral analyses which then mistake
the higher investments in institutions as higher transaction costs overall.
What appears to be obscured in the Wallis and North analysis is the dis-
tinction between ex ante investments in institutional capital and the ex post
cost of conducting exchange; empirical analyses which make that distinction
would appear worthwhile.
6 Distortive transaction cost policies
So far the analysis has focused on the nature of e¢ cient equilibria; the e¢ -
cient tax level,  g; provides an optimal trade-o¤ between the expected level
of consumption and its variability. This Section considers the impact of dis-
tortive (i.e., non-optimal) levels of the tax,  g.21 First, we look at constrained
optimal decisions about  s and #M over a range of imposed tax rates. Sec-
ond, we consider the welfare implications of the policies implied by models
of exogenous transaction costs.
21In this section S-capital and G-capital are equally e¢ cient in reducing transaction
costs so any di¤erence between  s and g reects the institutional distortion. Specically,
s = g = 0:075 and k = 30. All other parameters are as in Appendix Table 2 unless
otherwise stated.
20
6.1 Distortive institutions
The distortive behavior centres on the resources turned over to G-capital.
Such distortions might reect deeper political tensions, perhaps between the
electorate and a political class. Alternatively, they may reect irrational
voters, as in Caplan (2008). In any event, we do not model explicitly the
origins of these tensions.
Deviations in  g from its e¢ cient level can result in signicant compen-
sating changes in agent behavior, as Figure 2 shows. When  g deviates from
 g agents can respond by changing  s and/or market size. If market size does
not change, then  s always varies positively with  g: This follows from (14)
and the assumption that G and S are complements; a higher G increases the
marginal return to S-capital investment. Market size may rise or fall, for a
su¢ cient increase in  g. A higher  g lowers the exchange cost and so, ini-
tially, makes further risk-sharing (increasing market size) attractive enough
to incur the cost of a higher . However, for  g   g, diverting more re-
sources from production is costly and the gain from further diversication is
low; as such, market size and  s both fall because that is the only way to
reduce . In short, market size is hump-shaped in  g and, for some low and
high values of  g, agents optimally choose not to diversify (setting  s = 0
and #M = 1), even though their endowments are being taxed.
6.2 Transaction cost policies
There are at least three types of institutional objectives suggested by models
with exogenous exchange costs: First, institutions should deliver zero ex-
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Figure 2: Equilibrium with distortive institutions
change costs; second, institutions should maximise risk-sharing/market size;
and, third, institutions should minimize the size of the transaction sector. In
our model, zero exchange costs are not feasible; institutions which deliver an
innite number of trades at zero cost are themselves innitely costly. How-
ever, the analysis above shows that we can consider the second and third
type of policy prescription. The second is a rule that maximizes the (con-
strained optimal) choice of market size; the third minimizes the size of the
transaction sector. The market size policy is given by,
Mg := fmin f gj#M  #M 0g and  s optimalg : (18)
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That is, Mg is the lowest tax required to induce the maximum market size,
given that agents optimally choose market size and  s in response to  g: The
tax policy which minimizes the transaction sector is given by,
g := min fj#M > 1 and  s optimalg : (19)
For each policy the percentage change in certainty equivalent consumption
is calculated, e.g.,

1  u 1  uM =u 1 (u) 100, in moving to Mg from  g.
Table 1 describes various features of equilibrium under the di¤erent rules.
Table 1: The E¤ects of Distortive Institutions.
rule #M   g  s  %C
 g 18 0.4940 0.0550 0.0550 6.0795 -
Mg 28 0.5234 0.1210 0.0571 5.3711 4.3368
g 14 0.4906 0.0376 0.0537 6.4502 0.6400
Neither rule is optimal in a framework with endogenous transaction costs;
the Mg rule delivers too little directly productive capital and 

g too much
consumption variability. It is useful to analyze which is the more costly, and
why. Consider rst the Mg rule. Larger markets means, in short, higher
taxation to lower the costs of bilateral exchange. The transaction sector is
larger as a whole and its composition has shifted toward ex ante investments.
 g cannot increase by too much, however, since agents always have the option
of shifting resources to goods production by reducing market size and  s: For
the g rule, minimizing transaction costs requires exchange costs to be too
high. A low  g means that agents optimally form smaller markets and make
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smaller investment in S-capital, both actions reducing .
The loss from Mg is greater than that from 

g :
22 Institutions fostering
smaller exchange costs and bigger markets appear to be the more damaging
in welfare terms. By targeting market size, the government distortschoices
of both #M and  g; leaving agents, in e¤ect, with only one instrument to
respond,  s. The alternative g ; which minimizes the sum of all resources
allocated to transactions, leaves private agents with the choice of market
size and  s: The option for agents simply to consume their own endowment
constrains policy such that the outcome is not too far from that which max-
imizes expected utility. That additional exibility appears to reect some
of the empirical ndings of Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) who argue that
agents may nd a variety of formal and informal mechanisms to obviate poor
contracting institutions.
7 Transaction taxes
Policies are sometimes designed to raise revenue from a sector characterized
by high-frequency trading or to reduce the number of trades where those
trades are thought to be socially harmful in some way. We can consider a
tax, t, that simply makes individual exchanges more expensive,
 = (1 + t) [1  F (S;G)] k: (20)
Figure 3 demonstrates the e¤ect of a transaction tax where transaction
22This welfare ranking is robust to di¤erent values of k:
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costs are endogenous (solid line). Agents respond rst by increasing invest-
ments in institutions in order to dampen the e¤ect of the tax on the cost of
exchange. Relative to an environment where transaction costs are exogenous
(dashed line),23 market size is more robust to the introduction of a transac-
tion tax. In each environment, agents can avoid the tax by simply resorting
to autarky whenever the participation constraint is no longer satised. The
important di¤erence when transaction costs are endogenous is that agents
have individually allocated a portion of their endowment to support institu-
tions; in the exogenous case this investment has not occurred and so cannot
be retrieved by agents. That means that although agents appear less a¤ected
by the tax, they will opt for autarky at a level of the tax far lower than that
suggested when transaction costs are considered exogenous.24
Figure 3: The e¤ects of a transaction tax
23The exogenous transaction cost set-up xes  and the net endowment such that the
equilibrium when t = 0 is the same as that in the endogenous transaction cost environment
(i.e., g and  s are xed at the values which are optimal for t = 0).
24With endogenous transaction costs, autarky occurs at 6.9%; if we take them to be
exogenous, the autarky equilibrium is induced at 22.2%.
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8 Discussion and concluding remarks
Economists are increasingly focusing on the role of good institutions in pro-
moting growth, trade and other desiderata. The intention of this paper is to
link in a simple way impediments to transactions, institutional quality and
market size. The e¢ cient equilibrium of the model is consistent with signi-
cant transaction costs and investments in institutions. A distinction between
transaction costs and exchange costs was made. The impact of distortive in-
stitutions was also considered, although in a tentative and ultimately ad
hoc way. We argued that a number of what might be thought of as good
institutions are actually sub-optimal when transaction costs are endogenous.
It would seem important to extend the analysis in a number of directions.
First, although agents had di¤erent productive capabilities, this had a limited
impact as decisions over  s and  g were made before types were revealed. If
decisions over  s and  g were made after agentsproductive capabilities were
known (and capabilities are private information) then the analysis will be
somewhat more complicated. Related to this, incentive compatibility issues
were not to the fore because it was assumed that agents remained in markets
even if, ex post, they might have been better o¤under autarky. Nevertheless,
the framework developed above may prove useful in the analysis of optimal
tax and the role of government.
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A Proofs of Section 3 propositions
Proposition 2 There is a k > 0 small enough such that optimal market size
is one.
Proof. To the contrary, assume that
Eu
 
[(1   s    g) k   ] 
 
!;Mh
  Eu  ik ; (21)
for all k: All variables on the left-hand side reect optimizing decisions. Note,
in particular, that  > 1;8k: Observe that as k ! 0; (1   s    g)   (1  
F ())! (1  ) < 0, and that V is positive for all k > 0. Thus, there exists
a level of k; call it k, such that
lim
k!k
Eu
 
[(1   s    g) k   ] 
 
!;Mh
! 0;
As k ! k, the inequality in (21) is reversed.
Proposition 3 The optimal policy correspondence contains at most two
plans.
Proof. Let k denote a value of k such that Eu(P1jk) = Eu(P3jk) = V (k):
Assume that there also exists a P2 such that Eu(P1jk) = Eu(P2jk) =
Eu(P3jk): Let
 3 >  2 >  1; 3 > 2 > 1:
Now, denote
3 =
x
y
; 2 =
p
q
; 1 =
m
n
; (22)
where x; y; p; q;m and n are all positive integers. Dene  as follows:
 =
p
q
  x
y
m
n
  x
y
:
By assumption p
q
  x
y
< 0; m
n
  x
y
< 0, and p
q
  m
n
< 0, so 1    0: Finally,
note that q = p+ 1, n = m+ 1 and y = x+ 1. Thus
p
q
=

p(p+ 1) 1   x(x+ 1) 1
m(m+ 1) 1   x(x+ 1) 1

m
n
+

m(m+ 1) 1   p(p+ 1) 1
m(m+ 1) 1   x(x+ 1) 1

x
y
; (23)
that is, market size associated with P2 is a weighted average of the other two
optimal market sizes. Hence it follows, by the strict concavity of the utility
function, that either: (i) P2 is indeed an optimal plan and P1 and P3 are not;
or, (ii) P2 is optimal and identical to either P1 or P3; or, (iii) P2 = P1 = P3:
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Proposition 4 Let K denote the Borel sets of K  R++: There exists a
level of k 2 K; call it k, such that
Eu

[(1   1) k   11k] 
 
!;Mh1
	
= Eu

[(1   2) k   22k] 
 
!;Mh2
	
where  1 6=  2; 1 6= 2, Mh1 6= Mh2 and where maximized utility is identical
under both programs.
Proof. Let k 2 [k;
_
k]: Partition that set into into [k; k^) and (k^;
_
k] such that
the maxEu( j 8k < k^) < maxEu( j 8k > k^), and where (k > k^) >
(k < k^); #M(k > k^) > #M(k < k^): By Proposition 2, such a partition
is possible; it is also implied by (14)(15). Let fk1g denote any sequence in
[k; k^) converging to k^ and let fk2g be any sequence in (k^;
_
k] converging to k^.
Let V 1(k1) denote supEu(jk 2 [k; k^)), V 2(k2) denote supEu(jk 2 (k^;
_
k])
and V^ (k^) denote supEu(jk1 = k^). By Proposition 1 these value functions
are well dened and, by the Theorem of the Maximum, continuous. Hence,
there exists a  such that for
k1   k^ < =2 and k2   k^ < =2 one has that,V 1(k1)  V^ (k^) < "=2;V 2(k2)  V^ (k^) < "=2:
Hence V 1(k1)  V 2(k2)  V 1(k1)  V^ (k^)+ V 2(k2)  V^ (k^)
 "=2 + "=2
= ":
for k1; k2 close to k^ market size will not be changing. Hence, market size and
taxes are higher for all k 2 (k^;
_
k] compared with k 2 [k; k^): Expected utility
is identical with di¤erent optimal plans at k = k^.
Following Townsend (1978) and Boyd and Prescott (1985) one may char-
acterize core allocations directly. In the discussion of the e¢ cient equilibrium
in the main text we studied the equilibrium decision rules of an intermediary.
Townsend (1978) labelled that analysis the "cooperative" solution. Hence,
the equivalence of the core and cooperative solutions is now established,
Proposition 5 in the text.
Proposition 5 The allocations of the cooperative economy coincide with core
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allocations.
Proof. Consider the unique equilibrium: xh = fc; y;  ;#M; i 2 Mhg
for all h 2 H. This n-tuple determines F (S; G) and hence . Suppose a
strict subset of agents in the market intermediated by h; B Mh, can form
a blocking coalition (i.e., market). The cooperative equilibrium necessitates
that the blocking coalition cannot deviate from contributing  g on average.
The blocking intermediary chooses Bs given the market size #B < #M
h.
The agents in the blocking coalitions are better o¤ with the following pro-
gram:
ci = c;  ig = 

g; 8i 2 B;
1 = 2

#B   1
#B

kFS
 
SB; G

:
The consumption prole follows from optimizing over agents with identical,
strictly concave utility functions and the second condition was derived in the
text. By Remark 1, SB-capital is strictly lower and exchange costs strictly
higher. There are fewer transactions in this proposed market but each is more
costly. In addition, the investment portfolio is less diversied. Given that
market size and investment in S-capital deviate from the optimum, it must
be that the higher exchange cost and less diversication are not compensated
by fewer transactions; expected utility is necessarily lower. Now consider the
case B M: The same argument applies: In this proposed market, exchange
costs are strictly lower and investments higher. The deviation from rst-best
means that expected utility must be lower than in market M . Hence, the
cooperative allocation is in the core. Further, since the core is non-empty and
#M is the unique optimal market size, it follows that the core allocations
and the allocations of the cooperative economy coincide.
B Proofs of Section 4 propositions
Proposition 6 In the core, voluntary allocations to general capital are zero.
Proof. Consider an equilibrium in which  ig = 0 8 i 2 I, so that G = 0.
By Proposition 2, for k big enough, there is a positive level of S-capital that
is optimal,  is = 

s , 8 i 2 I; EU i = EU0 denotes expected utility under
this plan. Suppose a blocking coalition B exists such that an agent b 2 B
proposes  bg > 0 for i 2 B. If #B < @0, then G = 0 obtains and it follows
that EU i < EU0 for all i 2 B. Suppose, however that #B = @0 and that
an agent b 2 B proposes  bg > 0 for i 2 B. In that case G = Gb > 0. Since
#B > 0; some positive level of G is optimal, and so EU i > EU0 for each
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i 2 B. But now there exists a blocking coalition B0  B in which some agent
b0 2 B0 proposes  b0g = 0 for each i 2 B0. Since #B0 < @0 it remains the case
that G = Gb. Therefore, EU i (for i 2 B0) must be greater than EU i (for
i 2 B). So while there can exist blocking coalitions which propose  bg > 0 for
some i 2 B, they are not in the core; voluntarycontributions to G-capital
are zero.
Proposition 7 If any agent may propose an enforceable political manifesto
then all agents will be taxed according to (15). It follows that G = G.
Proof. Consider that, in the process of electioneering, a group of agents
V  I o¤er manifestos to be voted upon. Let G =  gk: The manifestoMg =
ff iggi2I jG  Gg of each agent g 2 V includes taxation levels for each agent
i 2 I as well as a proposed level of G-capital, G  G. It is assumed that
there is no deception; agents deliver on their manifesto, if elected. Agent i
votes for the manifesto that will provide her with the highest expected utility;
EU ijg0 is the expected utility to agent i if agent g0 forms the government.
V g
0
denotes the set of agents who vote for the manifesto of agent g0: So, if
#V g
0
> #V g
00
for every g00 2 Vng0, then agent g0 forms the government,
imposes taxation levels and delivers the level of G-capital in return. In the
core, all agents are taxed equally and no rents accrue: G = G. Consider the
alternative to this. If an agent g0 2 V o¤ers a manifesto Mg0 = ff ig0 =
 0ggi2I jG 0g in which  0gk > G 0 there is some other agent g00 2 V who o¤ers a
manifestoMg00 = ff ig00 =  0ggi2I jG 00g in which  0gk > G 00 > G 0 which delivers
#V g
00
> #V g
0
. Given perfect competitionin the political process, the rent
from governing is driven to zero, so that agent g; who sets  g to satisfy (15),
ensures that G = G = G.
C Proof of proposition 8
The equivalence of core and competitive equilibria is established by extending
the arguments of Townsend (1978). First, some notation is developed. Let
any agent h 2 I propose strategy P h for intermediating in a market. This
strategy has eight components: Mh is the market proposed by agent h; P h1
is the yield in terms of the consumption good of one share in the portfolio
of agent h; P h2 is the price in terms of the capital good at which agent h is
willing to buy an unlimited number of shares in the goods production of any
agent in Mh; P h3 is a xed fee in terms of the capital good for the purchase
of shares in the portfolio of agent h by i 2 Mh; P h4 is the price in terms of
the capital good at which agent h is willing to sell an unlimited number of
shares in her portfolio to agents in Mh; hs is the proportion of the capital
endowment that agent h proposes to invest in S-capital for that market; hg
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is similarly dened. Recall that with free political entry agent g delivers on
the manifesto promise and ensures that G = G. Finally, h (F ) is the ex post
exchange cost. It is not strictly necessary to include h (F ) in the denition
of the strategy space but it aids intuition to do so. In what follows, QihD is the
quantity of shares purchased by i in hs portfolio, whilst QhiS is the quantity of
shares sold by i to h: Aih is a switching function, where Aih = 1 if agent i buys
shares in the portfolio of intermediary h, and Aih = 0 otherwise. One may
characterize the optimal strategies for intermediaries and non-intermediaries
for a given market size. The following unconstrained optimization delivers
the supporting price vector. Finally, we reduce on notation by writing x
when we really mean x(!).
Denition 1 A competitive equilibrium is a set of actions

QijS; Q
ji
D; A
ij

	
and a strategy P i =

M i; P
i
1; P
i
2; P
i
3; P
i
4; 
i
s; 
i
g; 
i
(F )
	
for each agent
i 2 I (where for any variable x; the convention xii = 0 is adopted), an
allocation fci; yi; i 2 Ig and a set of markets which satisfy:
1. If agent i is not an intermediary (QjiD = 0;8j 2 I) then

yi; Q
ij
S; Q
ji
D; A
ih
 ; 
hi
s; 
hi
g; 
hi
 (F )
	
maximizes (24) subject to (25), (26) and (27) and P h = P h 8h 6= i: ci
is given by (26), and given (30)  (33).
2. Agents participate in, at most, one market,M . In each market there is
one intermediary such that h 2 M; Mh = M; and

 ihs ; 
ih
g ; 
ih(F )
	
=
 ihs; 
ih
g; 
ih
 (F )
	
: For each i 2Mnh; Aih = 1: For every such h; P h is
feasible, with yh chosen to maximize (28) subject to (29) and (30). ch
is given by (30).
3. There exist no blocking strategies for any agent of I.
Hence, a non-intermediary faces the following problem:
max
QihD ;Q
hi
S ;y
i;Aih
X
h:i2Mh

Aih
 
EU
 
QihDP
h
1 + y
ii  QhiS i

; (24)
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subject to the following constraints regarding feasibility and participation," X
h:i2Mh
 
Aih
  
(1  hs   hg)ki +QhiS P h2  QihDP h4   P h3   (F h)  yi
#  0;
(25)
ci(!) =
" X
h:i2Mh
 
Aih
  
QihDP
h
1 (!) + y
ii(!) QhiS i(!)
#  0;8! 2 
;
(26)
Aih = 1) Aij = 0;8i such that i 2M j;8j 6= h: (27)
An intermediary chooses a strategy to maximize,
maxEU
 
yhh +
X
i2Mh

QhiS 
i  QihDP h1
!
; (28)
subject to,"
(1  hs   hg)kh   (F h) (#M   1)  yh +
X
i2Mh

QihDP
h
4 + P
h
3  QhiS P h2
#  0;
(29)
ch(!) =
"X
i2Mh

QhiS 
i(!) QihDP h1 (!)

+ yhh(!)
#
 0;8! 2 
; (30)
and the following relations:
G   gk; (31)
Sh   sk; (32)
h =

1  F  Sh; G k; (33)X
i2Mh
P h3    (#M   1) =  2
(#M   1)
#M
: (34)
Equation (34) may be regarded as the free-entry constraint upon the equi-
librium intermediary strategy.
Proposition 9 If there exists a competitive equilibrium, with political free-
entry as dened above, then the equilibrium is in the core.
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Proof. Consider an equilibrium, for a given endowment k, for which a block-
ing coalition exists. Further, assume that this blocking coalition, denoted
#B, is a market in which transaction costs, production and consumption
are Pareto optimal. In such an equilibrium, consumption is equalized across
all agents in the blocking coalition: y = (1   s    g) k  

#Bb 1
#Bb

2b and
cb = c; 8i 2 B; EU(cb) > EU(ch), h 6= b: For some agent b 2 B, the following
are necessary conditions for an optimal strategy:
U 0()
X
i2Bb
i + b (#M)P b2 + 
b
X
i2Bb
i = 0; (35)
 U 0() (#B)P b1   b (#B)P b4   b (#B)P b1 = 0; (36)
U 0()b + b + bb = 0; (37)
bk bF 0(Sb;G)(#B 1)k2 bF 0(Sb;G)(#B 1)k2+2bF 0(Sb;G)k2 (#B   1)
#B
= 0;
(38)
where b; b; b; are unknown multipliers on constraints (29), (30) and (34),
respectively. For non-intermediaries, necessary conditions for an optimum
are,
U 0()i + + i = 0; (39)
 U 0()i   P b2  i = 0; (40)
U 0()P b1 + P b4 + P b1 = 0; (41)
where  and  are multipliers on constraints (25) and (26), respectively.
Equations (39) and (40) together imply that P b2 = 1, and so it follows that
P b4 = 1. Use these in the intermediarys rst-order conditions:
P b1 =  
B
U 0() + B ; (42)
and,
U 0() =  
h (#B)P b2P
i2Bb
i
  b: (43)
Therefore,
P b1 =

1
#B
X
i2Bb
i: (44)
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Finally, we have,
P b3 = [1  F (Sb;G)]k
(#B   2)
#B
: (45)
Since they are the shadow prices of dual constraints, it follows b =  b, so
then (38) implies,
1 = 2F 0S(S
b;G)k (#B   1)
#B
: (46)
Equation (46) determines the unique optimal, #Bs , for a given market size,
#B. Finally, the agent who decides on general capital investment will choose
1 = 2F 0G(S
b; G)k
(#B   1)
#B
: (47)
If this agent is a non-intermediary this follows from 0 = k+@P
b
3
@g
+ @
@g
; if
the agent is an intermediary, it follows from the analogue to equation (38).
Consider, a political manifesto that proposes a  g greater or less than that
proposed by (46). Since, the ECT is strictly concave, as is the utility function,
a tax rate exists such that the tax burden is no higher, but exchange costs
are lower. That is, consumption is strictly higher. However, an equilibrium
outcome has been constructed that is consistent with e¢ cient, optimizing
behavior (across intermediaries and non-intermediaries), that is nevertheless
inconsistent with property 3 in the denition of equilibrium.
Proposition 10 All core allocations can be supported as equilibria.
Proof. Assume that the optimal market size is greater than unity and less
than innity. Then the above rst-order conditions can be used directly
to construct an equilibrium that is a competitive equilibrium (since core
and competitive equilibria coincide). Since the optimal market size exists,
one may construct equilibrium markets. Hence, Properties 1 and 2 of the
denition of equilibrium are met. Finally, no set of agents will block this
allocation since it would be unable to attain a higher level of utility than
under the cooperative equilibrium.
D Comparative Static Results
Remark 1 shows that market size and ECT allocations increase in #M .
Propositions 3 and 4 demonstrates that there may exist a k at which two
(and no more than two) plans are optimal. It remains to characterize the
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relationship between k and transaction costs in between the k at which the
optimal market size changes.
Proposition 11 For a given market size greater than one, (i) transaction
costs are strictly decreasing in k; and (ii) if FS and FG are inelastic with
respect to S and G respectively, optimal investments in ECT rise unambigu-
ously in k.
Proof. Transaction costs: Recall  = (k   y) =k =  s+ g+2

#M 1
#M

(1  F ).
Thus,
@
@k
=
@ s
@k
+
@ g
@k
  

@F
@S

k
@ s
@k
+  s

+
@F
@G

k
@ g
@k
+  g

;
=  

k
@F
@S
  1

@ s
@k
 

k
@F
@G
  1

@ g
@k
  

 s
@F
@S
+  g
@F
@G

;
where  = 2

#M 1
#M

: And using the optimality conditions,
@
@k
=  ( s +  g)=k < 0: (48)
ECT investment: Throughout, it is assumed that FSG = FGS > 0; this is
consistent with the view that specic and general capital investments are
positively correlated. (14) and (15) together imply,
FSS (S;G)

 s +
@ s
@k
k

+ FSG (S;G)

 g +
@ g
@k
k

k + FS (S;G) = 0; (49)
FGG (S;G)

 g +
@ g
@k
k

+ FGS (S;G)

 s +
@ s
@k
k

k + FG (S;G) = 0: (50)
It should be recalled that we are characterizing optimal outcomes for a given
#M . From equation (50) it follows that @g
@k
k+ g =   FGkFGG 
FSG
kFGG
 
 s +
@s
@k
k

;
and combining with (49), one recovers an expression for the elasticity of  s
with respect to k:
@ s
@k
k
 s
=
FGFSG   FSFGG
 sk

FSSFGG   (FSG)2
   1: (51)
Equation (51) allows one to check the sign of the elasticity;  sk

FSSFGG   (FSG)2

is positive by the assumption of strict concavity and FGFSG FSFGG is posi-
tive since FG; FSG; FS > 0 and FGG < 0. As such, for @s@k
k
s
> 0, one requires
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that FSG (FG +  skFSG) > FGG (FS +  skFSS). The left hand side is posi-
tive; a su¢ cient condition then is that the right hand side is negative. This
requires that FS is inelastic with respect to S, i.e., that SFSSFS < 1. Assum-
ing the equivalent condition holds for general capital, optimal investments in
general and specic capital are, for a given market size, strictly increasing in
the level of the endowment.
E Numerical solution to the model
First, the choice of functional form for the ECT and utility function is dis-
cussed, as is the modelling of consumption-good productivity. Next, the
solution of the model is explained and analyzed holding xed the level of the
endowment. The solution of the model is then studied when k varies. Finally,
the robustness of the analysis to the risk aversion and ECT parameters is
examined.
E.1 A numerically tractable model
Consider a general CES form for the ECT,
F (S;G) = [Fs (S)
 + (1  )Fg (G)]1= ;
where  2 (0; 1) and 1= (1  ) is the constant elasticity of substitution.
Functions Fx (x = s, x = g) are continuous, decreasing and strictly concave
in their only argument; in particular, F 0x > 0, F
00
x < 0 and Fx(0) = 0,
Fx (y) ! 1 as y ! 1, F 0x(y) ! 0 as y ! 1 and F 0x(0) = 1 for x 2 fs; gg.
Fg and Fs need not be identical functions. Thus,
Fs = [1  exp (  sk)]s ;
Fg = [1  exp (  gk)]g ;
where s need not be equal to g and where ; s; g 2 (0; 1). These functions
and parametric restrictions have a number of useful properties that both
satisfy the restrictions on the ECT and facilitate numerical analysis. Taking
the rst partial of Fs with respect to  s one obtains,
F 0s = ks exp (  sk) [1  exp (  sk)]s 1
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The Inada-type requirements are readily conrmed. In addition, the para-
meters ; s; g 2 (0; 1) allow one to vary the e¤ectiveness of the ECT.25
one may use the parameters s; g to make distinctions between the relative
e¢ ciency of specic and general investments to exchange cost alleviation.
Agents have identical CRRA utility, U (x) = [x1    1] = (1  ) with  >
0 being the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. For numerical tractability, we
specialize to a two-state case in which production technologies are restricted
to  = f1; 2g where 1 < 2 and p(1) =  and p(2) = 1  .
The expected average technology for a market of size #M is given by the
following expression
E

#M

=
#MX
i=0

#M
i

#M i(1  )i [(#M   i)1 + i2]

=#M; (52)
which is invariant to #M . One may now state the problem:
  = argmax
#M
#MX
i=0

#M
i

#M i(1 )iU
" n
(1   s    g) k   (2)(#M 1)#M
o

 [(#M   i)1 + i2] =#M
#
subject to
2

#M   1
#M

[ [1  exp (  sk)]s + (1  ) [1  exp (  gk)]g]
1 
 
 ks exp (  sk) [1  exp (  sk)]s 1 = 1;
2

#M   1
#M

f [1  exp (  sk)]s + (1  ) [1  exp (  gk)]gg
1 
 
 (1  ) kg exp (  gk) [1  exp (  gk)]g 1 = 1;
where  =
n
1  [ [1  exp (  sk)]s + (1  ) [1  exp (  gk)]g]1=
o
k
and max f g is selected as the unique solution. The two constraints to solve
simultaneously for the optimal   =

 s; 

g
	
.
25We use MATLAB to compute equilibria. MATLAB code and simulation output is
available from the authors.
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E.2 ECT, diversication and utility with a xed en-
dowment
Table 2 gives the parameter values in the baseline case.
Table 2: Baseline Calibration for Endogenous Exchange Costs
endowment k 25
coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion  3
specic ECT curvature s 0.065
general ECT curvature g 0.085
ECT factor  0.03
weight on specic ECT  0.5
CES coe¢ cient s, 1  1
s
=  0.5
low technology 1 1
high technology 2 5
probability of low technology  0.5
The baseline case supposes a di¤erence in the e¤ectiveness of S-capital
and G-capital; g > s and so G-capital is the less e¢ cient.
First the e¤ect on optimal market size and expected utility of di¤erent
levels of ECT investment is examined. Agents choose how far (if at all)
to diversify given their residual endowment and exchange costs. Figure 4
displays expected utility solving at optimal market size over a grid of f s;  gg;
gure 5 gives choices of market size.
Figures 4 and 5 make clear that over some combinations of the f s;  gg
pairs, expected utility from diversication is higher than from not diversi-
fying. There is a peak in expected utility at some unique combination of
 s and  g. Clearly, market size does not peak at the peak of expected util-
ity: Sub-optimal institutions can induce larger markets, as was explored in
Section 6.
E.3 ECT, diversication and utility with a varying en-
dowment
Using the parameter values given in Table 2, k is permitted to vary. The so-
lution algorithm evaluates

 s; 

g
	
using the marginal conditions for market
sizes up to some #M^ > 1 and selects the diversication level that maxi-
mizes expected utility (increasing #M^ as required when #M^ is the utility
maximizing choice). Figure 1 gives results for these simulations.
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E.4 Robustness to risk aversion and ECT parameters
There are computational limitations to numerical analysis of the model.
MATLAB v.7, for example, will only calculate up to 170!. As can be seen in
the bottom-left panel of Figure 1, this will quickly become a limiting prob-
lem. However, one can see the e¤ect of changes in some other parameters.
Figures 6 and 7 give results under di¤erent parameterizations of risk aversion
and ECT e¢ ciency. In each, the central case (i.e., the middle line) reects
the parameterization in Table 2. Variations on the coe¢ cient of relative risk
aversion, , and on the ECT, , are Table 2 values multiplied by 1 1
6
.
Figure 6 shows some variation in optimal behavior in regard to risk aver-
sion. For a given endowment, the optimal market size is decreasing in risk
aversion. Further, agents are willing to spend more on diversication (i.e.,
forming markets), as can be seen by the size of transaction costs in each
case. Figure 7 demonstrates the e¤ect of varying the coe¢ cient on the ECT.
Reducing  means that agents diversify at lower endowments. The size of
transaction costs is lower for a given endowment, but relatively unchanged
for a given market size. The e¤ect of changing the exchange technology is
primarily to make it feasible for agents to diversify with a lower endowment:
The nature of that diversication is little a¤ected.
E.5 Distortive institutions and the transaction tax
For distortive institutions, the algorithm is a simple extension of that de-
scribed above: One uses the marginal condition to nd  s for a grid of  g
and identify the  g which obtains the two rules of thumb. For the transaction
tax, the value for t is introduced to the expression for  and agents optimize
over investments and market size taking t as given.
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Figure 4: Expected Utility and ECT Investment
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Figure 5: Optimal Market Size and ECT Investment
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Figure 6: Risk Aversion and Endogenous Exchange
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Figure 7: ECT Calibration and Endogenous Exchange
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